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Justice for Some? U.S. Efforts Under
Article 98 to Escape the Jurisdiction of
the International Criminal Court
By COSMOS EUBANY*
Introduction
In April 2002, ten countries ratified the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court and deposited their instruments with
the United Nations.' These actions brought the International
Criminal Court (ICC or the Court) into force with over sixty
ratifications. A month later, the United States declared that it no
longer intended to pursue ratification of the treaty and asked to
remove its signature from the statute.2 The United States then
launched a campaign to ensure that its nationals would not fall within
the jurisdiction of the Court.
The U.S. campaign is to secure control over a narrow area where
it shares jurisdiction with the ICC. The Rome Statute lists the ways in
which the ICC can have jurisdiction over a matter. Because the
United States is not a party to the treaty, the ICC's jurisdiction will
not apply to it most of the time. The United States is concerned,
however, about a situation where a U.S. national is accused of a crime
in the territory of a state that is a party to the Rome Statute. In such
a situation, the state (where the crime occurred) is obligated to
surrender the U.S. national to the ICC if the state is unable or
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2004;
B.A., University of California, Irvine. The author would like to thank Professor
Roht-Arriaza for her insightful ideas on this piece. The author would also like to
thank his family and friends for their support in this endeavor.
1. For information on the ratification of the Rome Statute, see Coalition for
International Criminal Court, at <www.iccnow.org> (visited Oct. 14, 2003).
2. See U.S. Dep't of State, Fact Sheet: The International Criminal Court (May 7,
2002), at <http://usembassy.state.gov/posts/pkl/wwwh02050707.html> [hereinafter
Fact Sheet].
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unwilling to prosecute the matter. This obligation applies even when
the accused is a national of a state that is not a party to the Rome
Statute This means that the ICC potentially has jurisdiction over the
nationals of non-state parties, a major concern for the United States.
To ensure that the ICC does not gain jurisdiction over its
nationals under any circumstance, the United States is currently
seeking "non-surrender" bilateral agreements with other states. The
United States justifies these agreements based on its interpretation of
Article 98(2) of the Rome Statute. These bilateral agreements will
allow the United States, and potentially other countries, to opt out of
the ICC's jurisdiction.
The ICC was designed to address some of the most egregious
wrongs, especially wrongs committed by those who would hide
behind the color of authority. If given a chance to operate as
intended, the Court may serve as an effective deterrent to such
heinous crimes. The danger of U.S. bilateral agreements under
Article 98(2) is that they could undermine the legitimacy of the new
Court, and these agreements may effect the Court's potential to
become an effective institution for redressing wrongs. U.S. efforts to
avoid the Court's jurisdiction may also threaten its own legitimacy as
an international leader in bringing to justice the perpetrators of war
crimes and crimes against humanity.
This note will discuss how U.S. bilateral agreements will effect
the legitimacy of the ICC. It will first trace the development of the
ICC. Next, it will examine the U.S. position on the ICC in order to
gain some insight into U.S. animosity towards the Court. Finally, the
note will trace U.S. efforts to secure immunity from the Court,
focusing on the U.S. interpretation of Article 98(2) of the Rome
Statute.
I. History
The idea of establishing an international forum to prosecute
gross violators of human rights norms dates back as far as 1899.' In
that year, the First Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of
3. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, United Nations
Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International
Court, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 183/9 (1998), arts. 12 & 13 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
4. M. Cherif Bassiouni & Christopher L. Blakesley, The Need for an
International Criminal Court in the New International World Order, 25 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 151, 152 (1992).
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International Disputes was convened At the end of World War I,
these ideas resurfaced and there was a movement to establish an
international criminal tribunal. In fact, the 1919 Treaty of Versailles
called for an international tribunal to prosecute Kaiser Wilhelm for
crimes against morality.6 And the 1923 Treaty of Sevres between the
Allies and Turkey called for a tribunal to prosecute those responsible
for the deaths of more than a half million Armenians Although the
international tribunal never came to fruition,8 these efforts illustrate
the growing need and pressure to create a forum to try those who
violate international norms.
Unfortunately, due to the political climate, there was no real
progress in the movement towards an international criminal tribunal
after World War I; although Kaiser Wilhelm was tried, the charges
were subsequently dismissed. However, the international community
was ready to make great strides in the pursuit of a permanent court
after World War II.
A. The Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals
The gross violations of human rights and the countless war
crimes committed in World War II motivated the international
community to create an ad hoc international criminal tribunal. 9 In
1945, at the end of the war, the Allies promulgated the London
Charter that established the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg." This was a significant step towards establishing a
permanent court for several reasons. First, it recognized that
individuals could be held accountable on an international level."
Second, it limited the use of traditionally accepted defenses such as
5. Id.
6. Mathew D. Peter, The Proposed International Criminal Court: A
Commentary on the Legal and Political Debates Regarding Jurisdiction that Threaten
the Establishment of an Effective Court, 24 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 177, 180
(1997).
7. M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Time Has Come for an International Criminal
Court, 1 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1991).
8. Peter, supra note 6, at 181 (Kaiser Wilhelm sought asylum in the Netherlands,
which refused to extradite him because the charges were politically motivated. The
Allies never prosecuted Turkish officials. The Allies feared the possibility of Turkey
becoming communist and opted instead for closer relations).
9. See Peggy E. Rancilio, From Nuremberg to Rome: Establishing an
International Criminal Court and the Need for U.S. Participation, 78 U. DET. MERCY
L. REV. 299,302 (2001).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 304-05.
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the superior orders defense and the Act of State defense 2  The
superior orders defense allowed a government official to assert that
he was merely following orders and therefore could not be held
accountable for his actions." The Act of State defense allowed a
party to claim immunity under the theory that the action was an act of
a sovereign state, which another country or international tribunal
could not judge." Third, the tribunal was significant because it
codified norms, violations of which would result in prosecution.'5 The
definition of crimes against humanity used by the Nuremburg
Tribunal has been incorporated by subsequent tribunals. 6
Similarly in Japan, a tribunal was established to try Japanese
officials for war crimes and crimes against humanity. Although the
Tokyo Tribunal was created by the declaration of General Douglas
MacArthur, 7 rather than by a commission consisting of allied states, it
had international support and its judges represented a variety of
nations. 8
The Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals were able to successfully
prosecute accomplices for war crimes and crimes against humanity,
but the tribunals sustained criticism and were referred to as the
"victor's vengeance."' 9  Many criticized the tribunals because they
were inconsistent. ° In contrast to Nuremberg, which tried high-
ranking Nazis, Emperor Hirohito received immunity from
prosecution in Tokyo.2' The general standard of proof used to convict
war criminals in both tribunals was low. In addition, critics argued
the Allies were applying laws ex post facto.22 This was partially due to
the fact that the international community failed to codify norms
12. Id. at 304.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 303 (the London Charter defined three categories of crimes: war crimes;
crimes against humanity; and crimes against peace).
16. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 3. arts. 5-8.
17. James Blount Griffin, A Predictive Framework for the Effectiveness of
International Criminal Tribunals, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 405, 409 (2001).
18. Id.
19. Bassiouni, supra note 7, at 5.
20. Griffin, supra note 17, at 412-20.
21. Id. at 415-19 (asserting that the inconsistencies between Nuremberg and
Tokyo were a result of the different political climates. While Germany surrendered
unconditionally, Japan refused to do so, preferring instead to fight for every island
until the United States agreed to grant immunity to Emperor Hirohito.).
22. Bassiouni, supra note 7, at 4.
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proscribing crimes against humanity after World War 1.23
Regardless of its flaws, both the Nuremberg and the Tokyo
Tribunals made significant headway in the journey to a permanent
international criminal court.
B. The Cold War A Few Steps Back
Unfortunately the Cold War stymied further progress in
establishing a permanent criminal court.24 While the international
community under the auspices of the United Nations created a
permanent court for state-to-state disputes (the International Court of
Justice), there was no similar tribunal created to try individuals for
war crimes and crimes against humanity.25 As a result, various
atrocities occurred unchecked. 26  The civil war in Nigeria, for
example, saw gross violations of human rights, mass murder and war
crimes, yet the actors were never punished.27
The international community did take steps to create a
permanent international criminal tribunal, however these efforts were
stymied by political considerations. In 1948, the United Nations
General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.28 The convention called for an
international penal tribunal to prosecute individuals who violate the
convention.29  Subsequently, the General Assembly asked the
members of the International Law Commission to research the
possibility of establishing an international penal tribunal. However,
due to opposition from states, the Commission's work toward
creating this penal tribunal was halted in order to clarify the
definition of "aggression."' The issue of establishing an international
criminal tribunal would not be addressed again until after the Cold
War.
In 1989, the notion of a permanent court returned to the
foreground when Trinidad and Tobago made an appeal to the United
23. Id.
24. Peter, supra note 6, at 183.
25. Id. at 184.
26. See id. (pointing to the atrocities that occurred in Cambodia under the Khmer
Rouge and Iraq under Saddam Hussein).
27. Bassiouni, supra note 7, at 7.
28. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
29. See Peter, supra note 6, at 184.
30. Id.
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Nations." Trinidad was having a difficult time prosecuting individuals
for international drug trafficking and sought an international criminal
court.32 In response, the United Nations asked the International Law
Commission to develop a draft statute.33 The draft statute would not
be completed and returned to the General Assembly until 1994.34 In
the interim, two cataclysmic events-the conflicts in former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda-forced the international community to
forge ahead with plans to create ad hoc tribunals similar to
Nuremberg.
C. International Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda
The struggles for independence in Yugoslavia between 1991 and
1992 saw so many atrocities-euphemistically termed "ethnic
cleansing"-that the international community felt compelled to bring
the violators to justice. "[M]urders, beatings, rapes, concentration
camps, confiscation of property, and the burning of villages" became
a widely practiced government policy.36 In response, the United
Nations created an ad hoc tribunal called the International Criminal
Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY).37 The court was created pursuant to
a provision of the U.N. Charter that gives the Security Council the
authority to take appropriate measures to respond to a breach of
peace or threat to peace.38 Although it was criticized, the ICTY was a
sign that the international community was ready to discuss creating a
forum to prosecute genocide, war crimes and crimes against
humanity.
In 1994, a year after the ICTY was established, a civil war in
Rwanda resulted in approximately 800,000 deaths. 9 In an effort to
consolidate his rule and homogenize the nation, President
Habyarimana set into motion the systematic killing of minority
Tutsis.4 Upon his death, Habyarimana's plan was carried out with
deadly accuracy by all levels of Hutu society, who singled out and
31. Id. at 185.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 186.
34. Rancilio, supra note 9, at 322.
35. See Griffin, supra note 17, at 422.
36. Id. at 425.
37. Id. at 426.
38. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
39. Griffin, supra note 17, at 421.
40. Id. at 429.
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slaughtered the Tutsis,4' as well as the Hutus who sympathized with
them. In response, the United Nations established an ad hoc tribunal
in Rwanda to try individuals for genocide war crimes and crimes
against humanity.42
D. The Rome Statute and the International Criminal Court
The ad hoc tribunals in Yugoslavia and Rwanda motivated the
General Assembly to promote the idea of an international criminal
court.43  Accordingly, the General Assembly established a
Preparatory Committee to finalize a draft statute and present it
before the Convention for the International Criminal Court. 4 On
July 17, 1998 an overwhelming majority of states present at the
Convention voted in favor of establishing a permanent international
criminal court.45 The Court came into force in April 2002, when the
sixtieth state deposited its ratification of the Rome Statute.
II. U.S. Opposition to the ICC
The U.S. position on the International Criminal Court changed
remarkably over the years. The United States played an instrumental
role in the events leading up to the Rome Conference of 1998.46 They
even sent delegations to help develop the Elements of Crimes and
Rules of Procedure and Evidence that would be used by the Court. 7
The United States withdrew its support once it became apparent that
it would not be able to control the Court's docket. 48 Although the
United States became a signatory to the Rome Statute under
President Clinton's administration, in May 2002, John Bolton, Under
Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, sent a
letter to the United Nations announcing that the United States was
going to "unsign" the treaty.49 Even though it was a signatory to the
Rome Statute, the United States was not bound by it because a two-
41. Id. at 430-31.
42. Id. at 422.
43. Damir Arnaut, When in Rome ... ? The International Criminal Court and
Avenues for U.S. Participation, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 525, 534 (2003).
44. Id. at 535.
45. Rancilio, supra note 9, at 323.
46. John Washburn, The International Criminal Court Arrives-The U.S.
Position: Status and Prospects, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 873, 878 (2002).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 879.
49. See Fact Sheet, supra note 2.
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thirds majority in the Senate had not ratified the treaty.'0 Signing
onto a treaty therefore, can be a political tool used by states to show
support for a proposal without putting the proposal into effect. Here,
the process of "unsigning" the treaty had a dramatic effect, signaling
that the United States no longer supported the ICC.5"
Even though the United States "unsigned" the Rome Statute, the
U.S. subsequent actions are against the object and purpose of the
treaty. Pursuant to Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties (Vienna Convention), once a country has signed a treaty it
may not act in a manner that defeats the object and purpose of the
treaty. Yet the United States, by concluding Article 98 agreements
and signing into law the American Servicemembers' Protection Act,
has apparently acted in ways deliberately calculated to defeat the
Rome Statute's object and purpose.
A. The United States' Position
U.S. officials put forth three main reasons why the United States
opposes the International Criminal Court. Officials argue that the
ICC violates accepted treaty law, that the Rome Statute runs counter
to the U.S. Constitution (Constitution), and that the Court will be a
forum to harass U.S. nationals in the hopes of frustrating U.S. efforts
abroad. These concerns are briefly addressed below in order to
provide an overview of the methods the United States is using to
undermine the Court.
The United States argues that the ICC departs from traditional
international law because it binds states that are not parties to the
Rome Statute.53 The Vienna Convention states that a treaty cannot
create obligations for non-party states.54 Therefore, the United States
claims, the ICC is in violation of the Vienna Convention to the extent
that it creates obligations for the United States as a non-party state.
The Rome Statute enumerates three circumstances under which
50. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
51. The idea of "unsigning" is a phenomenon created by the United States: it has
no precedent.
52. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 18, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. The United States has signed, but
not ratified the Vienna Convention; however, the U.S. State Department has
declared it to be a valid statement of customary international law.
53. Patricia McNerney, The International Criminal Court: Issues for
Consideration by the United States Senate, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 181, 183
(2001).
54. Vienna Convention, supra note 52, art. 34.
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the ICC has jurisdiction to hear a case:55 (1) if a case is referred by a
state that is a party to the treaty (State Party);56 (2) if a case is referred
by the U.N. Security Council;57 and (3) if the ICC prosecutor initiates
an investigation of a crime within the Court's competence.5
The Rome Statute further limits the ICC's jurisdiction to cases
where at least one state is a party to the treaty, unless the U.N.
Security Council refers the matter. 9 The ICC has jurisdiction if a
crime falling within the Rome Statute occurs in the territory of a State
Party to the treaty.' In such instances, the ICC has jurisdiction even
if the accused is a national of a non-party state. Also, the ICC has
jurisdiction if the accused is a national of a State Party." Accordingly,
if a war crime occurs in the territory of a State Party, or the person
accused is a national of a State Party, then the Court has jurisdiction
to hear the case.62 Ostensibly, a state that is not a party to the Rome
Statute can be bound if the state's national commits a war crime in
the territory of a State Party.
For example, if a person is accused of systematic torture
constituting a crime against humanity while within the territory of
State X, and State X is a party to the Rome Statute, then State X can
refer the matter to the ICC regardless of whether the accused is a
national of a state that is a party to the treaty. Similarly, if a war
crime is committed within the territory of State X by an individual
who is a national of a State Party, then the ICC prosecutor can refer
the case to the Court regardless of whether State X is a party to the
statute or not.63 Also a state can specially accept the Court's
jurisdiction over a situation, even if it is not a party.' This raises
many concerns for the United States.
Furthermore, proponents of the position that the ICC violates
accepted treaty law argue that by binding the United States, a non-
party state, the ICC is defining criminal law for all Americans.65 This,
55. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 13.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. art. 12.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Both scenarios assume that the states are either unable or unwilling to
adjudicate the matter.
64. See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 12.
65. McNerney, supra note 53, at 183.
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in turn, is problematic because the Court is not directly accountable
to the American people.'
The next category of U.S. arguments comes under the rubric of
constitutional law. Opponents of the Rome Statute argue that the
Court runs counter to the Constitution. Specifically, they point to
constitutional provisions that are in conflict with the Rome Statute,
including rights guaranteed to the accused and immunity of elected
officials.67
Because the ICC precludes official immunity and the
Constitution grants qualified immunity, many argue that the two
systems are incompatible.' Proponents of this view argue that, in a
worst-case scenario, a U.S. president may have to stand trial in the
ICC for his actions in his capacity as the head of state. This
procedure would be deemed contrary to U.S. law.
Furthermore, critics of the ICC argue that the ICC does not
follow some of the procedural safeguards afforded the accused
domestically, as enumerated in the Constitution and interpreted by
the judiciary. The U.S. legal system guarantees the right to a jury
trial; it does not allow the prosecutor to appeal an adverse ruling; and
it has protections against unreasonable searches and seizures.69 The
ICC, in contrast, does not offer a trial by jury; it allows the prosecutor
to appeal; and it does not specifically offer protections against
unreasonable searches and seizures.7
The United States has also expressed concerns that the ICC may
be used by other states to harass U.S. nationals. Because any state
can file a complaint with the prosecutor for the ICC to redress crimes
within the Court's competence,71 the United States fears its nationals
will find themselves before the Court defending frivolous claims
against them. The United States argues that it is a prime target for
this type of abuse because, as the last surviving superpower, it has
troops and service personnel stationed around the world. The North
Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) actions during the Kosovo
66. Id.
67. For a thorough discussion of the constitutional debate, see Diane Marie
Amann, The United States of America and the International Criminal Court, 50 AM. J.
COMp. L. 381 (2002).
68. Id. at 392-93.
69. Id. at 395-96.
70. Id.
71. See Rome Statute, supra, note 3, art. 12 (stating that a non party state can
have access to the Court by submitting to its jurisdiction).
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incursion, for example, were often characterized as war crimes. 72 In
fact, Serbia filed suit against NATO before the ICTY.73 Among its
claims, Serbia alleged that NATO was responsible for wanton
environmental destruction-a war crime-because it knowingly
armed its airplanes with depleted uranium shells. 74 This increases a
bomb's penetration capabilities but also leaves a radioactive trail on
the environment that can be toxic.
71
Although the prosecutor for the ICTY decided not to litigate this
matter, the United States argues that the Serbia suit is illustrative of
the sort of abuse U.S. officials will face in the ICC. As a result, the
United States will be slower to react in situations that require swift
and decisive action for fear that its officials could be subject to an
indictment by the ICC prosecutor.76
B. Criticisms of the U.S. Position
Proponents of the ICC make three main arguments in response
to the United States' position. First, supporters argue that the ICC
does not violate treaty law because it does not in fact bind non-party
states. Second, they maintain that although it is not a perfect fit, the
Rome Statute can coexist comfortably with the Constitution such that
the spirit of both documents is respected and followed. And last,
proponents assert that there are sufficient safeguards in the system to
alleviate concerns that a state would use the ICC as a forum for
harassing U.S. officials.
Supporters contend that the Rome Statute does not violate the
Vienna Convention because it does not actually bind non-party
states.77 Under the Rome Statute, nationals of a non-party state may
be subject to the ICC's jurisdiction if they are accused of a crime that
took place in the territory of a State Party.8 However, this does not
attach any new obligations to the non-party state, because individuals
are already subject to the laws of a state they are in, regardless of
72. Arnaut, supra note 43, at 557.
73. Id.
74. Joe Sills et al., Environmental Crimes in Military Actions and the International
Criminal Court (ICC)-United Nations Perspectives, Army Environmental Policy
Institute (April 2001), available at <www.iccnow.org/html/aepi200lO4.doc>.
75. Id. at 20.
76. Arnaut, supra note 43, at 559.
77. See Joshua Bevitz, Flawed Foreign Policy: Hypocritical U.S. Attitudes Toward
International Criminal Forums, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 931, 944-48 (2002).
78. Id.
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their nationality.79
Second, critics of the U.S. position maintain that the ICC is not
substantially contrary to the Constitution in areas concerning official
immunity or criminal procedure. Although the U.S. Supreme Court
has interpreted the Constitution to grant immunity to officials while
in office, it does not grant absolute immunity for criminal activity.'
The Constitution prescribes impeachment for misconduct by the
government officials. Subsequent to impeachment, a criminal trial
may follow where the former official may be tried and sentenced
accordingly." In addition, some argue that impeachment and
prosecution are two separate processes, and the Constitution does not
expressly prohibit the prosecution of a sitting president.'
Moreover, proponents of the ICC point out that the Constitution
does not always guarantee a right to a trial by jury. In a court-martial,
for example, the accused stands before a military judge and five
service members but without a jury. 3 Also, the proponents argue that
the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to a jury only for crimes
that occur within the United States. ' Therefore, prosecuting a U.S.
national before the ICC for crimes committed outside of the United
States would not violate the Constitution.
Last, supporters of the ICC call attention to the safeguards
designed to prevent using the Court as a forum for harassment. The
complimentarity principle precludes the ICC from investigating a
matter concurrently with a state.85 The ICC prosecutor must defer to
a state that would normally have jurisdiction over the matter.86 If the
United States is willing to investigate and prosecute its nationals for
war crimes, genocide or crimes against humanity, if warranted, the
U.S. would not have to submit to the jurisdiction of the ICC. The
Court was designed to supplement pre-existing national legal
institutions in instances where those institutions are so lacking in their
ability or willingness to investigate a matter that their actions, in
79. Id.
80. Amann, supra note 67, at 393.
81. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
82. See Amann, supra note 67, at 394.
83. Id. at 397.
84. Id. (quoting the Sixth Amendment: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed . ..
85. See Arnaut, supra note 43, at 548.
86. See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 18(1), (2).
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effect, allow violators to commit crimes with impunity.87 The ICC was
not designed to take priority over functioning, pre-existing legal
systems. Therefore the United States, with its highly sophisticated
legal system, would be likely to retain jurisdiction over a matter to the
exclusion of the ICC.
Moreover, because of the high threshold required to categorize
actions as constituting genocide, crimes against humanity or war
crimes, it is likely that the United States would investigate the matter
should such a claim be made. A crime against humanity, for example,
requires the commission of an act such as extermination "as part of a
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian
population."'  If a U.S. action rises to the level of a crime against
humanity, it is likely that the United States will already be
investigating the matter, precluding the ICC from conducting a
similar investigation.
Also, there is a procedural mechanism that will filter out
frivolous claims. Before a case can go forward, the pre-trial chamber
can review the allegations and all the evidence surrounding a case to
decide whether to issue a warrant against the accused or not.89 This
added safeguard will allow the pre-trial chamber to screen out claims
that do not rise to a level warranting prosecution.
Despite the criticisms, the United States is moving forward with a
plan to secure immunity from the Court by signing bilateral
agreements pursuant to Article 98 of the Rome Statue to prevent
extradition of U.S. nationals.
Il. Article 98
As a non-party state, the United States is not required to
surrender accused persons to the ICC for prosecution, nor is it
required to comply with requests to turn over evidence. Its main
87. Gerard E. O'Connor, Pursuit of Justice and Accountability: Why the United
States Should Support the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 27
HOFSTRA L. REV. 927, 963-64 (1999). Impunity should be distinguished from
immunity in that the former refers to freedom from punishment while the latter
refers to freedom from charge. Impunity as used in this piece has a negative
connotation, implying that although a rule of law applies to a person, he can escape
punishment for violating that law. Immunity, by contrast, means that the law itself
does not apply to the person. In addition, while immunity is granted to a select
group, impunity can apply generally, especially if there is a defect in the legal system.
As a result, impunity potentially has a wider scope than immunity.
88. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 7.
89. Id. art. 58(1).
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concern, however, is that a State Party to the Rome Statute may
surrender a U.S. national to the ICC. For this to occur, a U.S.
national would have to commit a crime falling within the Rome
Statute in the territory of another state. And both the aggrieved state
and the United States would have to be unable or unwilling to
prosecute the matter.' Although this is a remote possibility, the
United States is taking steps to ensure it never occurs. To attain this
objective, the United States has sought to use a loophole in the Rome
Statute and to create a blanket exemption in the Rules of Procedure
and Evidence. Pursuant to the former objective, the United States
signed bilateral agreements with countries to preclude the surrender
of U.S. nationals.9' Pursuant to the latter objective, the United States
inserted a procedural requirement into the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence that would have the effect of giving U.S. nationals a blanket
exemption from the ICC's reach.92
A. Interpreting Article 98(2)
Article 98 of the Rome Statute is entitled "Cooperation with
respect to waiver of immunity and consent to surrender."93 Article
98(2) reads as follows:
The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which
would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its
obligations under international agreements pursuant to which the
consent of a sending State is required to surrender a person of that
State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation
of the sending State for the giving of consent for the surrender.94
Interpretation of this provision must conform to accepted
principles of international law. Accordingly, the legislative history of
the provision does not have as much weight as an interpretation
derived from an ordinary reading of the provision. 9
A treaty must be interpreted according to the ordinary meaning
90. Chim~ne Keitner, Crafting the International Criminal Court: Trials and
Tribulations in Article 98(2), 6 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 215, 241 (2001).
91. John R. Schmertz & Mike Meier, United States Has Persuaded Two
Individual States Parties to Statute of International Criminal Court to Enter into
Bilateral Arrangements with it Under Article 98(2) of Statute Whereby Party Agrees
not to Turn Over American Service Members to ICC Without U.S. Consent, 8 INT'L L.
UPDATE 116 (2002).
92. Keitner, supra note 90, at 242-44.
93. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 98.
94. Id. art. 98(2).
95. Vienna Convention, supra note 52, art 32.
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of the terms used.' The terms of the treaty must be viewed as a
whole so that each individual term is interpreted within the context of
the entire provision. 7 In addition to the actual provision, the term
must be interpreted in the context of the entire treaty including the
preamble and annexes.98 Last, the interpretation of the terms must be
in light of the object and purpose of the treaty.99 The object and
purpose of the Rome Statute is to ensure that those responsible for
the most egregious crimes are tried according to the rule of law."
Using the "ordinary meaning of the term," Article 98(2)
precludes the ICC from requesting the surrender of an accused within
State A's custody if State A has a prior agreement with State B
regarding the surrender of State B's nationals. In that situation, the
ICC must first obtain the consent of State B before State A can
release the accused. A closer look at the provision shows that it was
not supposed to apply to any type of agreement between states but to
a specific type of agreement.
Many argue that Article 98(2) applies to Status of Forces
Agreements (SOFAs) between states. 1' SOFAs are bilateral
agreements between states that permit one state to deploy troops to
the territory of the other state.'2 These agreements allow the sending
state to maintain jurisdiction over its military and civilian personnel
while on foreign territory. 3
SOFAs allow the sending and receiving states to negotiate in
what instances they will have jurisdiction over military personnel.
Both states have an interest in the deployment of military personnel.
The sending state gains access to strategic points in the world that act
as staging grounds for troop deployment. In addition, the sending
state has a place in which it can replenish supplies and make
96. Id. art. 31(1).
97. Id.
98. Id. art. 31(2).
99. Id. art. 31(1).
100. Amnesty International, International Criminal Court: U.S. Efforts to Obtain
Impunity for Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes, Sept. 2, 2002, (AI
Index: IOR 40/025/2002), available at <http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/
engior400252002>, at 2 (referring to the preamble of the Rome Statute) [hereinafter
Amnesty Report].
101. Id. at 6.
102. Lt. Col. Arthur C. Bredemeyer, International Agreements: A Primer for the
Judge Advocate, 42 A.F. L. Rev. 101, 105 (1997).
103. Erik Rosenfeld, Application of U.S. Status of Forces Agreements to Article 98
of the Rome Statute, 2 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 273, 280 (2003).
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necessary repairs." The receiving state gains the added security of
having additional military, and the SOFA helps to strengthen bonds
between allies. Furthermore, the receiving state gains a commercial
advantage from receiving military personnel.
There is a possibility of a conflict between a SOFA and the
Rome Statute because a state may be under a SOFA obligation to
return an accused to his home state as well as a concurrent obligation
under the Rome Statute to surrender the accused to the ICC. To
avoid this potential conflict, Article 98(2) was created. It requires the
permission of the sending state before surrendering an accused to the
ICC.
Because the preparation history of the Rome Statute cannot be
given much weight, an interpretation of Article 98(2) must be based
on the ordinary reading of the provision." 6 An ordinary reading
shows that the provision indeed refers to SOFAs. The term "sending
state," as it is used in the article is one that is commonly used in
SOFAs between states.1 7 "Sending state" is, in fact, a term of art
used to denote a state that is deploying troops." Because this term is
mostly used in SOFAs, it is likely that the use of this term in Article
98(2) was a reference to a Status of Forces Agreement.
Although it cannot be given much weight, the preparatory
history of a treaty can be used as a supplemental means of
interpretation. °" As such, it can be used to confirm the meaning
derived from the ordinary reading of the provision."' The drafters of
Rome Statute were concerned the new treaty might conflict with pre-
existing SOFAs."' Although this account alone is not conclusive
evidence of the meaning of Article 98(2), it helps to confirm the plain
meaning of the provision.
The above interpretation is consistent with the object and
purpose of the treaty."2  It ensures that a person accused of an
104. THE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF VISITING FORCES 12 (Dieter Fleck ed.,
2001).
105. Id.
106. Vienna Convention, supra note 52, art. 32.
107. Amnesty Report, supra note 100, at 7.
108. Id.
109. Vienna Convention, supra note 52, art. 32.
110. Id.
111. See Memorandum from the NGO Coalition for the International Criminal
Court, at <www.iccnow.org/html/ciccart98memo20020823.pdf> (Aug. 23, 2002)
[hereinafter CICC Memo].
112. See Rome Statute, supra note 3, pmbl. (professing that the purpose of the
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egregious crime is tried either by a national court or by the ICC-if
the national court is unable or unwilling to perform its duties. Where
there is a SOFA involved and the ICC is unable to demand the
surrender of the accused without the consent of the sending state, the
SOFA provides for a trial either by the state where the crime was
committed or the accused's state of nationality.
B. U.S. Bilateral Agreements Under Article 98(2)
In May 2002, Undersecretary of State John Bolton sent a letter
to the United Nations saying that the United States no longer
supported the ICC' 13 The United States then commenced a
worldwide campaign to ensure that, as a non-party state, its nationals
would not be subject to the jurisdiction of the Court. To further this
goal, the United States drafted bilateral agreements pursuant to
Article 98(2). These agreements were circulated among party and
non-party states alike. The goal of the bilateral agreements was to
obligate a state to surrender U.S. nationals to the United States
instead of the ICC. However, this has been an uphill battle, and the
United States has met opposition both from states and from non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) that favor the ICC. Proponents
of the ICC question the legality of these "so-called bilateral
agreements.
114
The United States negotiates three types of bilateral agreements
depending on a state's relationship to the ICC."5 If a state is a party
to the Rome Statute, the United States negotiates either a reciprocal
or a non-reciprocal agreement.16 In reciprocal bilateral agreements,
both states agree not to deliver each other's nationals to the ICC."7
In non-reciprocal agreements, the state agrees not to surrender
United States nationals to the ICC; however, the United States is not
under the same obligation."'8 If a state is not a party to the Rome
Statute, the United States negotiates a bilateral agreement that also
prevents the state from sending U.S. nationals to third party states
Court is to guarantee enforcement of international justice as it is complementary to
national law).
113. See Fact Sheet, supra note 2.
114. See, e.g., Non-Governmental Organization Coalition for the International
Criminal Court, at <www.iccnow.org> (visited Oct. 14, 2003) (referring to U.S.
bilateral agreements as impunity agreements).
115. Amnesty Report, supra note 100, at 19.
116. Id. at 19-20.
117. Id. at 20.
118. Id.
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that are party to the ICC.1"9 This prevents the non-party state from
surrendering a U.S. national to a state that can then surrender the
national to the ICC.
Reciprocal bilateral agreements can potentially increase the
number of individuals that can escape the jurisdiction of the court and
escape prosecution altogether. In a reciprocal bilateral agreement,
each state agrees not to surrender nationals of the other to the Court.
Specifically, U.S. bilateral agreements preclude participating states
from surrendering American nationals to the ICC, and place similar
obligations on the United States to preclude the surrender of the
participating states' nationals to the Court. However, these nationals
might not escape prosecution entirely if they can be tried in a
domestic forum. A national of a state that has conducted a bilateral
agreement with the United States is generally less likely to escape
justice in the United States than a U.S. national in that country's
domestic courts. Any national of the bilateral agreement signatories
may escape justice if the state in which he is detained is "unable" to
prosecute the matter. But as a practical matter, the United States is
almost always willing and able to handle even complex cases, such as
those involving charges of crimes against humanity. Given the
countries with which the United States has concluded bilateral
agreements, a U.S. national is likely to be detained in a country with a
less-developed legal system, and has a correspondingly greater chance
of escaping prosecution because of that country's inability to try him.
U.S. nationals may, therefore, be able to escape both ICC jurisdiction
and domestic prosecution.
The issue can be further exacerbated if other states decide to
emulate the United States and enter into reciprocal bilateral
agreements with one another. This will increase, exponentially, the
number of individuals who can escape the jurisdiction of the court.
Imagine a scenario where State A and State B have signed a
reciprocal bilateral agreement with each other that prevents either
state from surrendering the other's nationals to the ICC. Assume
further that State B is not a party to the Rome Statute. If a national
of State B commits crimes against humanity on the territory of State
A and State A is "unable" to prosecute the matter, State A will also
be barred from surrendering the accused to the ICC because of the
agreement. State A may have to surrender the national to State B
who can conduct an insufficient investigation, or no investigation at
119. Id.
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all, and dismiss the claim against its national. As a result, the accused
may escape punishment for his conduct. If the U.S. bilateral treaty
campaign develops into a trend, it is possible that other countries will
follow suit and commence similar campaigns. This may increase the
number of individuals who can escape the jurisdiction of the court.
These reciprocal bilateral agreements are also potentially
problematic to the legitimacy and effectiveness of the ICC. The more
countries that gain immunity from the jurisdiction of the Court, the
less prestige the Court will have and the less the Court will be seen as
a vehicle for international justice. These reciprocal agreements,
therefore, have the potential of reducing the ICC to the status of a
paper tiger. Should other states follow the United States' lead and
conclude reciprocal agreements with one another, it will have a
detrimental effect on the legitimacy of the Court. In order for the
Court to effectively act as a vehicle for justice, it must have teeth
capable of biting anyone who would violate international norms. Or,
it must be perceived as having such teeth. Once states become
immune to the bite, the Court will lose its ability to act as a deterrent.
Once this is lost, even more countries will try to opt out of the Court's
jurisdiction.
At the time this note went into publication, the United States
had successfully negotiated bilateral agreements with sixty-five
countries.120 These countries include: Afghanistan; Albania; Antigua
& Barbuda; Azerbaijan; Bahrain; Bangladesh; Bhutan; Bolivia;
Bosnia & Herzegovina; Botswana; Cambodia; Colombia; Congo;
Djibouti; Dominican Republic; East Timor; Egypt; El Salvador;
Gabon; Gambia; Georgia; Ghana; Guinea; Honduras; India; Israel;
Ivory Coast; Kazakhstan; Kuwait; Liberia; Macedonia; Madagascar;
Malawi; Maldives; Marshall Islands; Mauritania; Mauritius;
Micronesia; Mongolia; Morocco; Mozambique; Nauru; Nepal;
Nicaragua; Nigeria; Pakistan; Palau; Panama; Philippines; Romania;
Rwanda; Senegal; Seychelles Islands; Sierra Leone; Solomon Islands;
Sri Lanka; Tajikistan; Thailand; Togo; Tonga; Tunisia; Tuvalu;
Uganda; Uzbekistan; and Zambia.12" ' Of these agreements, fourteen
120. See Washington Working Group on the International Criminal Court,
Countries With Bilateral Immunity Agreements, at
<www.wfa.org/issues/wicc/article98/tableofbias.html> (Oct. 29, 2003) (listing
countries that have signed bilateral agreements with the United States) [hereinafter
Bilateral Agreements].
121. Id.
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122are known to be reciprocal bilateral agreements.
C. The Stick Used to Encourage Bilateral Agreements
On August 2, 2002, President Bush signed the American
Servicemembers' Protection Act (ASPA or Act) 123 into law. The Act
gives the United States substantial leverage in its campaign to
conclude non-surrender bilateral agreements. This act will have a
resounding negative effect on other countries, on the United Nations
and ultimately, on the legitimacy of the ICC. In essence, the ASPA
severely limits U.S. cooperation with the ICC to instances where the
president specifically deems it necessary to aid the Court. 24  The
ASPA also takes the additional step of limiting U.S. participation in
peacekeeping and peace enforcing operations under the auspices of
the United Nations.'25 And the ASPA allows the United States to
withhold military assistance to states that have ratified the Rome
Statute.26
The ASPA may have the effect of limiting international
organizations, including the United Nations, from collaborating with
the ICC. This will compromise the effectiveness of the ICC and its
legitimacy will further plummet. Section 7425(b) of the ASPA
prevents the United States from giving information to the United
Nations that relates to a matter that is under investigation by the ICC,
unless there are assurances that the information will not be made
available to the Court.
7
The implication of this provision is that the United Nations may
not be able to collaborate or share information with the ICC. The
United States, as a common practice, may require assurances from
the United Nations before it turns over any information. For
example, if the United States is involved in collecting information for
a U.N. agency, the United States may first require the agency to sign
an agreement not to release the information to the ICC, should the
122. Id. (listing reciprocal bilateral agreements with Azerbaijan, Bangladesh,
Georgia, India, Israel, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Rwanda, Seychelles Islands,
Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan and Uganda).
123. The American Servicemembers' Protection Act was proposed as an
amendment to the 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further Recovery
from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States, 22 U.S.C. §§ 7421-7432
(2003).
124. Id. § 7430.
125. Id. § 7424.
126. Id. § 7426.
127. Id. § 7425(b).
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information become relevant to an investigation by the Court. Such a
provision would greatly limit the resources of the ICC and would
require the Court to conduct duplicative inquiries.
Similarly, section 7429 of the ASPA allows the United States to
withhold funds earmarked for the United Nations and any other
international organization.'28 Ostensibly, such funds will be withheld
if used to support the ICC, creating a fear among U.N. officials that
the United States will use this provision as an excuse to further
withhold U.N. funds. This would give the United Nations greater
incentive not to collaborate with the ICC, which, in turn, would erode
the legitimacy of the Court.
In addition to withholding information and funds from the
United Nations, the ASPA will limit U.S. participation in
peacekeeping and peace enforcing operations to instances where: the
U.N. Security Council exempts U.S. armed forces, the ICC lacks
jurisdiction over the state where the forces are deployed, the state
requiring U.N. forces has signed non-surrender bilateral agreements
with the United States, or U.S. national interests compel U.S.
participation."9
The ASPA will also exponentially increase the pressure on other
states to sign bilateral agreements with the United States. Under the
ASPA, the United States must withhold military assistance from
states that are a party to the Rome Statute."3  This provision,
however, can be waived if: it is in U.S. national interest to offer
military assistance; the state has concluded non-surrender bilateral
agreements with the United States; or the state is a member of
NATO, a major non-NATO ally or Taiwan. "' 1 In those cases the
president must explicitly exempt the state from the ASPA so that it
may receive military funds.
Withholding military assistance can be particularly devastating to
a state because U.S. military aid comes in many forms including
monetary aid, military training, and military education.'32 A state that
cannot qualify for a waiver, and consequently is faced with losing
these privileges, may be driven by its concerns for national security to
128. Id. § 7429.
129. Sean D. Murphy, American Servicemembers' Protection Act, 96 AM. J. INT'L
L. 975, 976 (2002).
130. 22 U.S.C. § 7426.
131. Id.
132. Lilian V. Faulhaber, American Servicemembers' Protection Act of 2002, 40
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 537, 547 (2003).
20031
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
sign a non-surrender bilateral agreement with the United States. This
will create further hardship for the Court, as more and more states
will feel obligated to extend exemptions to U.S. nationals. Thus far,
the United States has withheld millions of dollars in military
assistance from states party to the Rome Statute pursuant to the
ASPA.33
The most devastating blow to the legitimacy of the ICC comes
from the ASPA provision that allows the president to "use all means
necessary and appropriate to bring about the release" of U.S.
nationals."' Dubbed the "Hague Invasion Act, '35 this provision
contemplates the use of force to remove a U.S. national held before
the ICC in the Netherlands. Although it is not likely that the United
States will invade the ICC in the Hague, the provision manifests a
level of disrespect for the ICC.
D. Criticism of U.S. Bilateral Agreements
Some NGOs understand the potential impact U.S. bilateral
agreements will have on the ICC. In the midst of the U.S. offensive
to secure non-surrender agreements, these groups are launching a
powerful counter-offensive against the United States. The NGOs
argue that U.S. bilateral agreements are illegal and have the effect of
giving U.S. nationals impunity." Accordingly, these U.S. bilateral
agreements are derogatorily referred to as "impunity agreements.
138
Critics argue that U.S. bilateral treaties exempt more people than
Article 98(2) intended.139 Because Article 98(2) was drafted to
account for SOFAs between states, subsequent agreements pursuant
to the Article must meet the criteria of a SOFA. SOFAs generally
133. See Washington Working Group on the International Criminal Court,
Bilateral Immunity Agreements: Suspension of Military Assistance, at
<www.wfa.org/issues/wicc/factsheets/militaryassistance.html> (Sept. 29, 2003) (listing,
in U.S. dollars, the amount of military assistance the United States has withheld for
fiscal year 2004).
134. 22 U.S.C. § 7427.
135. Faulhaber, supra note 132, at 546.
136. The Coalition for the International Criminal Court has launched an equally
aggressive campaign to promote the ICC. See Coalition for the International
Criminal Court, <www.iccnow.org> (visited Oct. 16, 2003). See also Kintto Lucas,
Activists Oppose Impunity Agreement for U.S. Personnel, INTER PRESS SERV., Sept.
27, 2002, available at 2002 WL 4915627.
137. See, e.g., Amnesty Report, supra note 100.
138. See U.S. Bilateral "Non Surrender" Agreements Regarding the International
Criminal Court, M2 PRESSWIRE, Oct. 1, 2002, available at WL 26803083.
139. Amnesty International, supra note 100, at 23.
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apply to current members of the military and related civilians. In
contrast, U.S. bilateral agreements include as persons within the
purview of the agreement: "former government officials, employees
(including contractors),.., or nationals of one party."'14
In addition, critics argue U.S. bilateral agreements allow U.S.
nationals to act with impunity, in violation of the object and purpose
of the Rome Statute.'42 U.S. bilateral agreements only commit the
United States to prosecute matters within the ICC's jurisdiction
"where appropriate.' '4 3 Ostensibly, the United States will be able to
request the surrender of its nationals accused of a crime against
humanity and decide, in bad faith, that it is not appropriate to
adjudicate the matter. The Rome Statue was created to ensure that
individuals are held responsible for their atrocities, either in a
national or an international court.'" Allowing the United States to
opt not to prosecute a serious crime violates that purpose, and this
will have a resounding effect on the ICC.
Because the United States is not a party to the Rome Statute, the
provisions of the treaty do not bind it. Moreover, because the United
States has "unsigned" the Rome Statute, it is no longer obligated to
uphold the object and purpose of the treaty. The issue of the object
and purpose of the treaty, however, becomes pertinent when the
United States negotiates a bilateral agreement with a state that is
bound by the treaty. There, the state must be careful that its
agreement conforms to the object and purpose of the treaty. In legal
systems where the treaty becomes a part of the national law of a state,
a State Party's decision to sign a bilateral agreement with the United
States can be challenged in court." This may explain why the
European Union (EU) did not consider signing U.S. bilateral
agreements until it explored their implications.'"
140. Id.
141. See U.S.-Proposed "Article 98" Agreement Template, in CICC Memo, supra
note 111.
142. See Rome Statute, supra note 3, pmbl.
143. U.S.-Proposed "Article 98" Agreement Template, in CICC Memo, supra
note 111.
144. See Rome Statute, supra note 3, pmbl.
145. Chris Stephen, Credibility of International Criminal Court Maintained by
European Union Decision to Allow American Nationals Limited Immunity, IWPR
TRIBUNAL UPDATE No. 285, Oct. 14-19, 2002, available at
<www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/tri/tri_285_2_eng.txt>.
146. See id. The United States began its non-surrender agreement campaign in
May 2002. The EU did not make a common declaration on the matter until late
September 2002.
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States soon joined the opposition campaign launched against
U.S. bilateral non-surrender agreements. The EU spoke with one
voice on the matter. Its decision came after months of pressure on
the EU as a whole and on individual member states.1"7 Although the
EU ultimately left the decision up to individual member states, it set
out general principles to guide each state's decision.4 These general
principles prohibit states from signing non-surrender agreements with
the United States that grant immunity.149 Agreements with the
United States will have to specify that the United States will
prosecute its citizens that are accused of crimes on foreign territory.
The EU also prohibits reciprocal agreements.15 Therefore, if a
member of the EU signs a bilateral agreement prohibiting the
surrender of U.S. nationals, the state cannot require the United States
to refuse to surrender the state's nationals to the Court. Lastly, the
EU limited the scope of bilateral agreements."' While the U.S. non-
surrender agreements encompass past and present military officials
and other nationals under any circumstances, the EU limited its
agreements to U.S. nationals sent abroad, as the term is used in
SOFAs.'52 This means that the agreements will only apply to current
military officials and others who are specifically sent by the United
States.
The EU decision can be seen as a victory in the campaign against
U.S. bilateral agreements. Although the EU gave in to pressure by
allowing member states to negotiate bilateral agreements with the
United States, its guiding principles are so restrictive that the United
States gains little ground on the matter. In addition, several member
states of the EU have openly expressed their opposition to U.S. non-
surrender agreements.'53
While the EU decision can be hailed as a victory for the
147. Id.
148. Bruce Zagaris, U.S. Presses for Exemptions as ICC Starts Picking Judges, 18
INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP, 492 (2002).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Many countries have spoken out against the U.S. bilateral agreement
campaign, including Canada, Germany and France. See Washington Working Group
on the International Criminal Court, U.S. Impunity Agreements: a Summary, at
<www.wfa.org/issues/wicc/article98/art98factsheet.html> (Oct. 16, 2003) (listing
countries that have vigorously dissented to U.S. bilateral agreements) [hereinafter
Impunity Agreements].
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International Criminal Court, it is a victory of one battle at best.
Meanwhile the larger war for international support-either of the
ICC or the United States-continues. It will be waged in countries
throughout the world, and the United States has already claimed
sixty-five allies.'54 Victory for the United States could sound the
death knell for the ICC, especially if other countries, inspired by the
United States, seek ways to escape the Court's jurisdiction. On the
other hand, because of the difficulty the United States is having trying
to negotiate these bilateral agreements " ' and the amount of pressure
that the United States is placing on countries to sign the agreements,
other countries may not have the political clout to conduct similar
anti-ICC campaigns.' Only time will tell how successful the United
States will be in negotiating non-surrender agreements and whether
other countries will follow suit.
IV. A Blanket Exemption:
Another Way to Escape ICC Jurisdiction
Before the United States set out on its agenda to create bilateral
agreements pursuant to Article 98(2), it sought to create a blanket
exemption for U.S. nationals. As members of the ICC Preparatory
Committee neared the June 2000 deadline for drafting the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence and the Elements of Crimes (Rules and
Elements), the U.S. delegation craftily added a rule that would apply
in conjunction with Article 98(2). While Article 98(2) precludes a
State Party from surrendering accused persons to the ICC in
situations where it violates international agreements with other
states,'57 the U.S. addition to the Rules and Elements would preclude
the surrender where it violates international agreements between the
154. See Bilateral Agreements, supra note 120.
155. See Impunity Agreements, supra note 153.
156. The American Servicemembers' Protection Act allows the United States to
withhold military aid to countries that do not sign the non-surrender agreements. It
can now use military aid to induce countries to sign bilateral agreements. For a
discussion of the Act, see Washington Working Group on the International Criminal
Court, American Servicemembers' Protection Act of 2002, at
<www.wfa.org/issues/wicc/aspafinaUaspahome.html>; see also Keva Lightbourne,
Bahamas May be Torn Between Caricom, U.S., THE NASSAU GUARDIAN, Mar. 1,
2003, available at <www.amicc.org/doc/marchl-03.pdf> (discussing threats by the
United States to withhold military aid from the Bahamas if they do not sign the
bilateral agreement).
157. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 98(2).
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ICC and other states.158
The proposed addition would permit the ICC to conclude
agreements directly with states to exclude their nationals from the
Court's jurisdiction."' The addition was the first step of a two-step
plan by the United States to achieve exemption from the Court's
jurisdiction. Step one would allow states or other organizations such
as the United Nations to actively make international agreements with
the Court."6 These agreements would require the Court to respect
the immunity agreements between states and between the Court and
individual states or the Court and other organizations. This was a
way to widen the scope of Article 98(2) to encompass a wider range
of agreements. Step two, which ultimately failed, attempted to create
an agreement between the ICC and the United Nations whereby U.S.
nationals as well as the nationals of other non-party states would be
excluded from the jurisdiction of the Court.61 The proposed addition
was included in the Rules and Elements draft, but the United States
was forced to shelve the agreement between the United Nations and
the ICC.
The attempt at the Preparatory Committee shows the U.S.
resolve. The two-step plan would have opened the floodgates and
allowed each country to negotiate exemption agreements with the
ICC. If such a plan had come to fruition, the legitimacy of the ICC
would have been defeated before the election of the Court's judges.
This indicates that the United States plans to ultimately remove the
teeth from the ICC and compromise its legitimacy. If the Rome
Statute were to have created a blanket exemption for U.S. nationals,
the Court would never be taken seriously. Instead it would be viewed
as another institution controlled by the world's last standing
superpower.
Conclusion
It is likely that the United States will eventually find total
exemption from the ICC. As a non-party state, the instances where
the United States will fall under the ICC's jurisdiction are already
limited. Further, the principle of complimentarity will ensure that if
158. David Stoelting et al., The United States and the International Criminal Court,
35 INT'L LAW. 614, 615 (2001).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 616.
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the United States adjudicates a matter sufficiently, the ICC will lose
its jurisdiction. What remains is a very narrow sphere where the
United States and the ICC share jurisdiction, and in the overlapping
area the United States will likely have safeguards in place to ensure
that it retains control. At the moment, the United States is pursuing
bilateral agreements as its safeguard. The United States has a lot of
political influence on the international stage. It funds programs in
various countries and has troops stationed in countries around the
world. It is likely that in time the United States will be able to
persuade enough countries to sign non-surrender agreements. It is
also likely that U.S. exemption will effect the legitimacy of the Court.
If the most powerful nation in the world does not participate in the
Court, it will send a signal to other countries that will also seek to
gain immunity from the Court. This will inevitably cause the Court to
lose prestige. The fact that states are signing reciprocal bilateral
agreements is evidence that others are taking cues from the United
States. Avoiding the jurisdiction of the Court is also bad for the
United States because it may sacrifice its voice in the human rights
realm as an advocate for holding perpetrators of war crimes, crimes
against humanity and genocide accountable to the rule of law. In the
wake of a U.S. war on terrorism, losing this voice may prove
detrimental to U.S. interests.
Although chances of a U.S. national succumbing to the
jurisdiction of the ICC are remote even without the United States
pursuing bilateral agreements, the world must oppose U.S. efforts as
a matter of principle. The ICC is in its infancy. As such, its success
will be determined by whether it is perceived as a legitimate
institution applying international norms equally or whether it is
perceived as another tool of western countries to bludgeon their
lesser-developed counterparts into compliance.
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